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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-INNOCENT BYSTANDER
ENJOYS PROTECTION OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
Plaintiff was injured when a shotgun, fired by another, exploded.
The explosion was allegedly caused by a defective shotgun shell, pur-
chased by the shooter. Plaintiff brought a personal injury action
against the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer of the shell, alleging
separate counts of negligence and breach of implied warranty. With
reference to the latter count, plaintiff contended that the shell was not
suitable for its intended use, and that, even though he was neither the
purchaser nor the user of the shell, he was entitled to rely upon the im-
plied warranty of fitness and suitability which attended the manu-
facture, distribution, and sale of the product. The trial court dismissed
the implied warranty count for want of privity of contract between
plaintiff and defendants. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court
reversed.1 Held: Lack of privity is no defense to a personal injury
action brought by an innocent bystander on the theory of breach of
implied warranty; it is sufficient that plaintiff allege and prove a defect
of manufacture and the causal connection between the defect and the
injury suffered. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85,
133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).-
Historically, privity of contract was required in order for an injured
party to sustain an action against the manufacturer of the injury-
causing product.3 The rigidity of this rule, however, has been relaxed
by the courts. Privity has been eliminated in actions against a manu-
facturer based on negligence.4 To sustain an action in implied warranty,
however, privity is still required under the prevailing view,5 although
many courts adhering to this view have found privity based on fictions
derived from agency, assignment, and third-party beneficiary princi-
ples.' Some courts have all but eliminated the privity requirement when
I The vote for reversal was 5-2. The dissenters agreed with the trial court that
plaintiff's action in implied warranty was barred by lack of privity.
225 MID. L. REv. 267 (1965).
3 The origin of the privity requirement is generally credited to Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See, e.g., 2 HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS 1535 n.4 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 658 (3d ed. 1964). But see Com-
ment, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194, 195 (1962).
4See Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), 26 B.U.L. REv.
411, 34 GEO. L.J. 377, 44 MicH. L. REv. 1157; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), 16 COLUM. L. REv. 428, 29 HARv. L. REV. 866, 25 YALE
L.J. 679; 1 HURsH, AmERcAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LiABiLTY 608 (1961).
G See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1570 (1956) ; 1 HutRSH, op. cit. supra note 4, at
631-48.
6 Twenty-nine highly imaginative theories have been compiled in Gilliam, Products
Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OE L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1958).
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the injury-causing product was intended for human consumption' or
was inherently dangerous;8 even in these exceptional cases, the plaintiff,
if not the purchaser or remote purchaser, was at least the user" of the
injury-causing product. Prior to the decision in the principal case, no
court had extended implied warranty protection to an innocent by-
stander.
Because so much had already been written about the requirement
of privity in breach of implied warranty actions, 0 the court in the
principal case dispensed with an elaborately reasoned opinion, per-
ceiving the need to state a definite rule "with references which appeal
to us as both trendful [sic] and best reasoned."" The court turned to
its recent decisions involving implied warranty actions,'2 and evalu-
ated them as removing lack of privity from available defenses.' Refer-
7 See cases collected in 2 FRumER & FIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABIITY 1505-60 (1964).
8 Id. at 1201-407. The trend of expanding the types of injury-causing products for
which the manufacturer is liable without privity is dramatically illustrated by the recent
history of the Restatement of Torts (Second), § 402A. When submitted originally, the
new section provided strict liability for sellers of "food for human consumption." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). To this section was
subsequently added "products for intimate bodily use." (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
Finally the rule was adopted imposing liability upon one who sells "any product" in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1964). This latest change was said to be required or the Restatement of Torts
(Second) would be out-of-date by the time it is published. Id. at 2.
9 See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d
149 (9th Cir. 1962) (plaintiff borrowed inflammable hula skirt).
1o The court cited the following articles: Bushnell, Practical Aspects of Defending
Products Liability Cases, 11 DEFENSE L.J. 99 (1962) ; Jaeger, Prwity of Warranty:
Ha.s the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1963); Jaeger, Product Liability,
the Constructive Warranty, 39 Nom.- DAME LAW. 501 (1964); Jaeger, Warranties of
Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 493(1962) ; Note, Strict Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUm. L. Rrv. 916 (1964). The
following articles, though not a comprehensive list, are also worthy of note: Ashe, So
You're Going to Try a Products Liability Case, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 66 (1961); Gilliam,
supra note 6; Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 928 (1957); Keeton, Products Liabilit3-Liability With-
out Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 855 (1963); Keeton,
Products Liability--Current Developments, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 193 (1961); Noel,
Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963
(1957) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Comment, Implied Warranty: Let's Abandon Privity, 16
BAYLOR L. REV. 263 (1964); Comment, Implied Warranties-The Privity Rule and
Strict Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194 (1962).
"1133 N.W.2d at 134.
32 Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Co., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54 (1965) (admin-
istratrix successfully brought action against manufacturer of defective welding unit
and compressed gas containers causing death to employee of purchaser); Barefield v.
LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963) (privity not
required by consumer who was wife of purchaser, action failed on other grounds);
Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W2d 918 (1961)
(consumer of offensive soft-drink purchased by husband recovered against manufac-
turer); Spence v. Three Rivers Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958)
(remote purchaser recovered for property damage arising from defective cinder blocks).
'3 133 N.W.2d at 134-35: "I would say definitely that [cases cited note 12 supra] ...
have put an end in Michigan to the defense of no privity, certainly so far as concerns an
innocent bystander injured as this plaintiff pleads....!
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ring with approval to these cases and to a recent landmark New Jersey
case,'" the court asked rhetorically whether the result would have been
any different in those cases, based on the same reasoning, if the plain-
tiffs had been innocent bystanders. The rationale, as expressed
by the court, was that "the manufacturer is best able to control the
dangers arising from defects of manufacture."'" The court concluded:
The fact is that Michigan, for abundantly worthy reasons, has eliminated
lack of privity as a defense to actions as at bar, and that when the factual
position of the suing plaintiff is so far causally removed as to render the
defect a remote cause of his injury or damage, a case not now before us
will come to consideration.'6
In essence, the court in the principal case recognized implied war-
ranty as being a tortious action, completely divorced from contract.
Thus it was logically able to eliminate contractual privity from the ele-
ments necessary to sustain an implied warranty action. By recognizing
implied warranty as a duty imposed by law, rather than a duty arising
from contract, 7 the court in the principal case evaded the major pitfall.
on the path away from privityY
Another reason the privity requirement has endured is that courts
have been reluctant to break from a precedent dating back to 1842.'1
Although the original statement of the privity doctrine has long been
exposed as dictum," the rule that privity is required to sustain an action
'4 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 46
CORNEuL L.Q. 607 (1961), 74 HA.v. L. Ray. 630 (1961), 59 MicH. L. REv. 467 (1961)
(wife of purchaser recovered from auto manufacturer in implied warranty for personal
injuries sustained when steering mechanism failed in car she was driving).
15 133 N.W2d at 134.
1' Id. at 135.
1? Accord, Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A2d 919 (Munic. Ct.
App. Wash. D.C. 1962) ; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F2d 501, 504 (10th Cir.
1959) (applying Kansas Law).
18 A most recent example of this pitfall is illustrated by justice O'Hara's dissent in
the principal case, 133 N.W.2d at 133:
An action for breach of warranty, whether or not "sounding" in tort, is still
essentially a contract action. To recover thereunder a plaintiff has to have some
relationship to the contract of sale, and the use which implicitly follows thereafter.
10 See note 3 supra.
2 0 In Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842),
the driver of a mailcoach sued a contractor who had agreed with the Postmaster
General to keep the coach in repair. Plaintiff was denied recovery. The Exchequer
properly sustained defendant's demurrer on grounds that plaintiff was not a party to
the contract between defendant and the Postmaster General, which was the contract on
which plaintiff based his claim. Though defendant was not the manufacturer of the
mailcoach, the general rule developed from the broad dictum of Lord Abinger, C.B.,
that lack of privity between the parties precluded recovery against the manufacturer.
See I FRUMER & FRIanarAN, op. c t. mipra note 7, at 15; 1 Huasu, op. cit. supra note
4, at 530-32.
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against a manufacturer persisted because of judicial inertia.21 Perhaps
the privity rule was justified at the time of its origin: mid-nineteenth
century manufacturers were struggling for existence, and their meager
assets required protection if industrial growth was to be encouraged.
This protection is less warranted in the present day, however, since
industry, being well-developed, is not so dependent upon judicial pro-
tection for further growth.22 While argued in terms of privity, the basic
issue appears to be to what extent the public should be protected from
injury-causing products, or, alternatively, to what extent the manu-
facturer should be held liable. The principal case does not purport to
resolve this question.2
Although the decision in the principal case furthers the current trend
toward protecting the public, as opposed to the protection formerly
afforded manufacturers,24 the holding does not impose absolute liabil-
ity; that is, a plaintiff may not recover merely because he was injured
by a product which defendant manufactured. Plaintiff must still prove
a defect.25 The rule announced in the principal case places upon plaintiff
the burden of proving that the product was defective and that a causal
connection existed between the defect and the injury.2" According to a
prior Michigan case, however, yet a further element of proof must be
met: that the defect existed when the product left the defendant's
control.2 7 The principal case does not resolve how this burden may be
met by plaintiff, but a prior case suggests the use of circumstantial
evidence.2" Such use, in effect, would be analogous to application of the
21 For a recent example of the privity rule applied, see Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963) (implied warranty of fitness held not to run to
employee of purchaser).
22 For discussions in factual contexts, see Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See generally 2 HARPERa & JAMES, TORTS 1535, 1606
(1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 672-74 (3d ed. 1964).
23 "It is enough to say.. . that it is now not necessary to establish 'the outside limits
of the warranty protection'." 133 N.W.2d at 135.
24 For evidence of this trend see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1535 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 678
(3d ed. 1964) ; Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE
L. Rxv. 1-2, 63-64, 141 (1963).
25 It should be noted that the court in the principal case does not define what is
meant by the term "defect." See note 33 infra. For problems in formulating a satis-
factory definition of the term, see Traynor, The Ways .and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367-71 (1965).
28 133 N.W2d at 134, 135. Accord, Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
185 A.2d 919 (Munic. Ct. App. Wash. D.C. 1962).
27 Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W2d 918, 922
(1961). Accord, Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98
N.E.2d 164 (1951) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934);
Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).2
8 Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 27, at 922: "[The rule
that plaintiff must show the presence of offensive condition when it left defendant]
[VoL. 41
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
negligence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,0 even though implied warranty
does not require proof of negligence on the part of defendant."0 Infer-
ences could be raised by introducing into evidence circumstances
which would lead reasonable men to believe that the product was
defective and that the defect existed at the time the product left de-
fendant's control. Provided that the causal connection could also be
proved, plaintiff could establish his case in implied warranty. In prac-
tice, this method of proof has been applied to implied warranty cases in
other jurisdictions.3
Unlike in a negligence action established by the use of res ipsa loqui-
fur, the defendant in an implied warranty action cannot escape liability
by showing due care in manufacturing the product. The result, of
course, is strict liability; i.e., the defendant may be held liable without
negligence on his part.3 This result appears to further the trend of
... does not impose an impossible burden on the plaintiff. Rather he is aided by the
doctrine most clearly enunciated by Mr. Justice Wiest many years ago when [he] ...
said, 'The poisoned flour speaks for itself; unexplained, it evidences negligence ....'
It speaks with equal clarity when the action is brought on a theory of warranty.
Unexplained it evidences such breach ... "
2D The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a device whereby an injured plaintiff may
establish a cause of action in negligence by introducing circumstantial evidence. Recog-
nized and accepted in some form or another by all courts, the doctrine is far from
uniform. However, the usual conditions for applying the doctrine are these:
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Some courts have
at least suggested a fourth condition, that evidence as to the true explanation of the
event must be more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. PROS-
sER, TORTS 218 (3d ed. 1964).
The procedural effect of the doctrine differs in various jurisdictions. In some courts,
satisfaction of the conditions gives rise to a presunption of negligence which, if not
rebutted, results in a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff. In most courts, however,
satisfaction of the conditions merely gives rise to an inference of negligence, sufficient
to carry plaintiff's case past a motion to dismiss and to the jury. See 2 HAR'ER &
JAmES, TORTS 1099-102 (1956). See generally id. at 1075-107; 1 FRumuF & FRIEmAN,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 282-337; 1 HuRSH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 364-81; PROSSER,
TORTS 215-39 (3d ed. 1964).
30 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W2d at 134, quoting with approval
from Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A2d 919, 922 (Munic. Ct
App. Wash. D.C. 1962). Accord, Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363
Mich. 235, 109 N.W2d 918, 922 (1961). Cf. Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d
687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945) (statutory warranty).
31 Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501, 370 P2d 116 (1962) (chemical
burns from beauty shop permanent wave preparation); LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952) (deteriorated fly in soft-drink
bottle) ; Atkinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 275 S.W2d 41 (Mo. 1955) (cigar butt in
soft-drink bottle).
32 See cases cited note 31 supra.
33 The benefits of applying this standard of strict liability, as far as plaintiff's bur-
den of proof is concerned, would seem to depend upon the type of defect on which
plaintiff is suing. Two types of defects are evident, (1) a defect which occurs when
the product is not as it was designed because of a mistake in the manufacturing process,
and (2) a defect which arises from faulty design. As to the first type, plaintiff is aided
by the strict liability standard because he is relieved of the burden of proving that the
1966]
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shifting from an attempt to do justice between the parties towards an
attempt to formulate rules which (1) provide an incentive to minimize
accident-causing conduct on the part of the manufacturer, and (2) to
distribute the risk among those who benefit from that conduct which
is ultimately accident-causing." Still, the result is not liability without
fault. As defined by Dean Prosser, "'fault' is a failure to live up to an
ideal of conduct." 5 When a product causes injury because of a defect,
the manufacturer of that product has failed to meet the ideal of conduct
because he has allowed the defect to arise and has caused the defective
product to be marketed."0 The impact of the principal case is simply
this: while the holding does not broaden the basis of the manufactur-
er's liability, the decision has enlarged his total liability by introducing
a new class of potential plaintiffs-innocent bystanders.
STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT-BUILDER-VENDOR OF
MASS PRODUCED HOUSE STRICTLY LIABLE FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS
Defendant, a mass-developer who planned communities and sold
homes on the basis of advertised models, installed a water heater in
a house without following the manufacturer's recommendations.1
Plaintiffs leased the house from defendant's vendee, and plaintiffs'
minor son was subsequently scalded by excessively hot water drawn
mistake of manufacture was the result of the defendant's negligence. As to the second
type, however, plaintiff must prove that the design was unreasonably dangerous, or
that a reasonable man would not put it on the market because of the risks associated
with it. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13-21 (1965).
Though relieved of proving the defendant manufacturer's knowledge of the risks, the
plaintiff is little aided by the strict liability standard when his action is based on faulty
design because he still has the burden of proving essentially the same elements he
would have been required to prove had his action been based on negligence. Compare
the defect in the principal case with the defect in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J.
70,207 A.2d 314 (1965), 41 WASH. L. REv. -.
34 For analyses of some ramifications of this problem, see Calabresi, The Decision
for Accidents: An Approach to Notfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HxAv. L. Rnv. 713
(1965) ; Calabresi, Somne Thoughts an Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961) ; Cowan, Somhe Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STArt.
L. REv. 1077 (1965).
35 PROSsaa, TORTS 507 (3d ed. 1964).
36 The manufacturer can still escape liability in implied warranty if plaintiff's injury
was not in fact caused by the defective product, as when plaintiff had warning of the
offensive condition and failed to heed it. See Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W2d 786 (1963).
1The manufacturer of the heating unit had recommended that a mixing valve be
installed outside the boiler to avoid delivery of excessively hot water for domestic
use. Instead of following the recommendations, defendant relied on combination spigots
to mix the water, cautioning purchasers to open the cold top part way before turning
on the hot tap.
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